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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the forces behind how secession1 states come to 
be externally recognised and gain international legal sovereignty. This paper addresses the 
overtly one-dimensional approach of current secession theories pertaining to external 
recognition. I posit to fill a gap in the existing literature by creating a new theory derived 
from the two existing sets of secession literature; external and internal. This will be a 
hybrid theory that incorporates both existing theoretical lenses to give a more complete 
picture of the forces at work behind external recognition. I then apply this theory to the 
case studies of Somaliland and South Sudan. The research aims to identify and isolate 
factors that influence and explain the external recognition of South Sudan and the non-
recognition of Somaliland. South Sudan’s external recognition is found to be explained 
solely by levels of external involvement while Somaliland is found to have more 
influential internal factors than external. This leads to the conclusion that within the 
hybrid theory, external factors prove the most significant in external recognition. 
However, only through a hybrid theory can well-rounded and comprehensive research be 
conducted. The paper contributes to the academic field within Political Science of 
secessionist movements and state creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 A secessionist movement is defined as a ‘nationalist groups attempting to separate from one 
state in order to create a newly independent state for its people.’ Coggins, ‘Friends in High Places, 454.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
May 18, 1991 Somaliland SNM officials declare the North-Western territory free from 
their Southern counter-part and begin consolidating power in the region along the old 
British Protectorate lines. July 9, 2011 South Sudanese citizens pour out onto the streets 
to celebrate the formal creation of their new state. Shots of the new flag clutched by a 
jubilant society ring out all over the world and hope appears high that the years of turmoil 
will finally come to an end. These are two examples of secession. One has been externally 
recognised and has gained international legal sovereignty while the other remains in a 
grey area, detached and functioning separately from Somalia but with no recognition from 
external states.  
Nonetheless, Somaliland possesses all the features of a fully functioning state including a 
police force, army, centralised government, own currency, flag and vehicle registration 
plates. It can also issue visas, ministers can travel to several states on Somaliland 
passports and it has successfully carried out democratic district, presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Nonetheless it remains, according to Bradbury, stranded in a 
‘diplomatic no man’s land.’2 It has been noted that this de facto state has achieved a level 
of authority and security provision not often seen in the Horn of Africa’s delicate history, 
even having been deemed a ‘democratic oases.’3 However, often to outsiders who have 
heard of Somaliland it is simply associated as one of many ‘tribal factions’ in Somalia’s 
chaos.4 Furthermore, the non-recognition of Somaliland is in fact holding back further 
development, significantly limiting economic and diplomatic avenues. 5 
South Sudan had long considered itself to be distinct from the North. Southerners 
possessed similar modes of production, livelihood, culture and religious traditions. But 
most of all, they shared the overwhelming sentiment of not being from the North of 
Sudan.6 Before the January 2011 referendum, civil war had raged in the country for all but 
                                                 
2
 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 5. 
3
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 99. 
4
 Coggins ‘Secession, Recognition and the International Politics of Statehood’, 46. 
5
 Sturman, ‘New Norms, Old Boundaries’, in Pavkovic & Radan, On the Way to Statehood, 82. 
6
 Jok, ‘Diversity, Unity’, 7. 
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eleven years since 1955. Periods of intense violence and policies of startling brutality by 
the Khartoum-based Northern government against the South had characterised Sudan 
since it was decolonised. Only after two civil wars that cost between 2.2 to 3 million 
human deaths and displaced four million more since 1956,7 could the South separate from 
its Arab and Islamic counter-part and gain its own (mostly) defined territory. This is a 
territory that was and continues to be dominated ‘by internal conflict and marred by 
underdevelopment’ with a legacy of mass-insecurity left by the civil wars.8 Yet after the 
2003 ceasefire agreement, signing the CPA in 2005 and the January 2011 Southern 
referendum, the overwhelming results of which were eventually accepted by Khartoum, 
international recognition to the rudimentary state was granted leading to the creation of 
the 194th internationally recognised state.  
These two cases are not exceptions, rather it has been noted that the number of ongoing 
global secession projects in search of external recognition has not dipped below fifty since 
World War II.9 What forces lead to some of them being externally recognised while 
others are not? This question has received surprisingly little attention from political 
analysts considering the implications affect the basis of the international system that so 
much of their work is carried out around. 
Indeed, state secession forces us to re-evaluate the very international order that we are 
accustomed to, one built along neatly divided and clearly identifiable lines that form 
entities. Secession will involve the breakaway of a specific section of territory, claiming 
de facto rule over it and its inhabitants and effectively becoming an unrecognised state.10 
Secession does not ‘fit’ into the tidy model of ‘recognised’ and demarcated states and is 
more often than not treated as undermining the territorial integrity of sovereign states and 
the established international order. These claims force us to address the wider issue of 
modern perceptions towards the formation of states. Secession movements want to engage 
with the international system as it is here that they wish to gain membership. However, 
the historically state-centric international system often views such movements through the 
                                                 
7
 A displacement figure not seen since World War II. Jok, ‘Diversity, Unity’, 9. Belloni, ‘The 
Birth of South Sudan’, 412. 
8
 Lacher, ‘South Sudan’, 5. 
9
 Coggins, ‘Friends in High Places’, 437. 
10
 With no international legal sovereignty. 
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prism security threats and foreign-policy challenges to the global political environment 
we live in. 11  Due to an inability to imagine the international order not based on 
sovereignty, disorder is consequently assumed in its absence.12 
This study intends to address the issue. An analysis and comparison of the case studies 
which possess ‘a remarkable number of similarities that mean they will make for 
fascinating case studies,’13 in relation to external recognition of secession will make for 
original research. Existing comparisons are slight and only address the perceived 
precedence of South Sudan as opposed to testable reasons for external recognition or non-
recognition. Indeed, ‘drawing a regional parallel with (...) South Sudan (...) might offer a 
good basis [to assess Somaliland’s secession claim].’14 
The research is a piece in a puzzle, attempting to highlight reasons behind what I term 
‘selective recognition’. This refers to lack of clearly augmented rules concerning external 
recognition of secession. Although this research only addresses two cases of which just 
one is still a secession claim, divergences in external reactions to the cases are apparent. 
For the fact remains that South Sudan has gained external recognition while Somaliland 
has not despite possessing all the attributes of a working state.15 One has advanced from 
being an unrecognised entity while the other remains in a limbo. This thesis asks the 
following central research question: what factors serve to explain external recognition of 
state secession leading to international legal sovereignty in South Sudan and not in 
Somaliland? 
I argue that to answer the question and to really understand external recognition of 
secession, research much take into account all the forces at play. Therefore, I create an 
original hybrid theory that uses elements from both external and internal secession theory 
and is able to provide a broader picture. By testing the new theory against two case 
studies, I offer comparative research that will advance the central question.  
                                                 
11
 Caspersen, & Stansfield, Unrecognized States in the International System, 3.  
12
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 23. 
13
 Jones, ‘Somaliland and South Sudan – the Challenging Road Ahead’. 
14
 Walls & Kibble, ‘Beyond Polarity’, 51. 
15
 Ibid, 33. 
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The central finding of the research is that both internal and external explanations provide 
insight into why South Sudan is externally recognised and Somaliland is not. I find that 
South Sudan’s recognition was influenced solely by external factors and that Somaliland 
meets much of the internal secession theory criteria but less of the external. Therefore, I 
conclude that external factors, namely external state motives and interests, are most 
significant in explaining external recognition of South Sudan and not Somaliland. This 
research concurs with the work of Coggins, but maintains that only a hybrid theory can 
provide for extensive research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
External Recognition, Secession Theory and Hypotheses Construction 
 
Section (1) of this Chapter identifies what is meant by external recognition. I also 
introduce international legal sovereignty which is gained from external state recognition. 
Theorised by Krasner, international legal sovereignty is the mutual recognition between 
two juridical states.16 With this clarified, Section (2) reviews existing secession theories. 
The purpose is to address existing explanations behind the Dependent Variable (DV) of 
the paper; external recognition following secession, leading to international legal 
sovereignty. It outlines and synthesises the main arguments of the two academic secession 
theories, external and internal explanations for recognition. Due to the illustrative nature 
of this research, the Section will use Somaliland’s non-recognition and South Sudan’s 
external recognition to demonstrate the two theories.  
Following on, in Section (3) I make my case for a hybrid secession theory used in this 
paper which combines internal and external secession theories. I argue that both sets must 
be tested if we are to fully understand the driving forces behind external recognition from 
a state. Finally, in Section (4) I apply my theory through the formulation of five 
hypotheses. I demonstrate how a hybrid theory will allow for well-rounded and 
comprehensive research.  
 
(1) External Recognition 
To clarify, when referring to ‘external recognition’ this study means individual external 
states. This does not exclude the home-state of the secession. External recognition is the 
process of an external state publicly declaring they recognise the secession as an entity 
which should be allowed to operate under its own accord. Clearly, in this research 
external recognition can only come after secession. I agree with Coggins (and use her turn 
                                                 
16
 These are independent territorial entities. 
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of phrase) that ‘Great Power’ states are the most influential in the global arena. These 
states possess the most material power and are depicted as extending this power through 
wielding influence over other states to externally recognise or not recognise secession. 
Their actions are able to set a precedent they may not be aware of themselves.17 Therefore, 
the study will concentrate on these regional or global gatekeepers of recognition but 
through the term ‘external states’.  
However, one external state recognising secession does not constitute full recognition in 
the way required to be a member of the international community and sit in the UNGA. 
Rather a critical mass of external states must extend recognition. While this research 
concentrates on single states, it remains significant as ‘each individual state’s recognition 
increases the chances that the actor will become a state,’18 especially when that state is a 
‘Great Power’.  
For clarity, throughout the study the act of ‘external recognition’ will always be 
accompanied with ‘international legal sovereignty’ (below), I argue the two are not 
separable. ‘Domestic authority’ will refer to internal state features and ‘external’ and 
‘outside’ both in terms of a state and forces mean the same. 
 
1.2 International Legal Sovereignty 
It is difficult to separate an unrecognised secession state from the concept of sovereignty. 
After all, it is ultimately external recognition by an outside state that secession desires. 
This recognition must be based on some sort of process or concept. The notion of 
sovereignty continues to dominate state proceedings and is intertwined with the 
introduction of new states.  
Unrecognised secession movements tackle the statement that ‘there are states and there is 
little else,’ head-on.19 The international community has had to adapt and address a number 
of breakaway entities within which large variety exist. Solutions have ranged from 
autonomous territories, mini-states, failed states, states which exercise diminished or 
                                                 
17
 Coggins, ‘Secession, Recognition and the International Politics of Statehood’, 13. 
18
 Coggins, ‘Friends in High Places’, 452. 
19
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 3. 
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residual sovereignty, ‘incremental secession’ and even a state with ‘supervised 
independence’.20 Recognised states then are not always as clearly delineated as might be 
imagined. Furthermore, the distinction between recognised and unrecognised states tends 
to be exaggerated. The only meaningful difference and distinguishing feature is their 
achievement of external recognition or not.21  
Traditional and constitutive views of sovereignty prescribe that without external 
recognition, a secession state cannot technically exist. None have put this as 
straightforward as Miller who notes that ‘just as we know a camel or a chair when we see 
one, so we know a sovereign state.’22 Therefore, a secession state may exercise a high-
level of domestic authority but without external recognition this amounts to nothing. To 
be recognised the secession must be the final authority and free from foreign sources. 
However as revealed, differences between recognised states are already numerous. Why 
then should secessions be treated in such a one-track and limited manner? Krasner 
addresses this. He views the system of sovereign states as highly flexible with a long 
history of accommodating entities that do not conform to traditional views of sovereignty. 
While he, like this study, also concerns himself with external recognition, he does so 
through the notion of international legal sovereignty. This is one of his four sovereignty 
elements and is the most relevant for this research.23 It entails that a ‘mutual recognition’ 
of authority takes place between two territorial entities that both have formal juridical 
independence.24  Once this external recognition has taken place by a critical mass of 
external states, de jure status and international membership will be achieved. 
By an external state entering into recognition agreement with the unrecognised secession, 
it confers a new level of legitimacy not previously possessed. This has been almost 
universally desired by all states, Somaliland and South Sudan being no different. The 
benefits derived from recognition as a juridical equal can then be accessed, including the 
                                                 
20
 For more on these examples, see Ibid, 3-7. 
21
 Coggins, ‘Friends in High Places’, 447. 
22
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 13. 
23
 The others being Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence 
sovereignty. It does not pose a problem to this research to only use one, Krasner himself recognises 
that with one form of sovereignty, another may be diminished. This means that the four do not 
constitute one rounded theory. 
24
 Krasner, Organised Hypocrisy, 15. 
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ability to freely decide which agreements and treaties to enter25 or perhaps create. Thus, 
international legal sovereignty allows a previously unrecognised state to diplomatically 
represent itself and benefit from international forces.  
Further benefits of external recognition include security agreements with new allies and 
the right to non-intervention, diplomatic immunity, increased foreign capital investment 
by outside enterprises, the opportunity to enter international financial institutions and 
official legal authority including the recognition of its binding internal laws.26 It has also 
been noted as boosting the state’s international standings as a viable political regime, 
increasing a regimes security with norms of non-intervention being applicable and finally 
as legitimising any struggle endured to get to where they are.27  
This notion of sovereignty will be adopted throughout the research and is seen as the 
endgame for unrecognised states. However the question remains, what forces explain 
whether an external state chooses to recognise a secession claim or not? The next Section 
addresses the two main theories attempting to provide an explanation.  
 
(2) Secession Theory  
External Secession Theory 
External secession theory asserts that for secession to be recognised by an external state, 
be it regional or international, that state must have a strategic interest for doing so. 
External theory believes too much emphasis is placed on internal factors which do not 
provide a full picture of the international forces at work concerning secession recognition. 
Coggins asserts that the international community is inherently social, building on 
Horowitz’s hunch that ‘whether a secession movement [succeeds] [...] is determined by 
the balance of forces and interests that extend beyond the state.’28 Coggins maintains that 
ignoring the influences and particularly interests of external actors who convene in a 
surprisingly communal political environment is theoretically and she proves empirically, 
                                                 
25
 And can then also leave. 
26
 Krasner, Organised Hypocrisy, 17. Coggins, ‘Friends in High Places’, 448. 
27
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 8 & 120. 
28
 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 230. 
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narrow-minded. In her research, it is shown that secessions with a friend in a high place (a 
Great Power) are more likely to gain the external recognition needed and acquire 
international legal sovereignty.  
After all, it is external powers who ultimately decide what status a secession movement is 
branded, ‘recognised’ or ‘unrecognised’. This makes internal factors and the associated 
level of effective authority limited as it does not account for external state motives and 
interests. Rather, if an external power is intent on recognising secession, they will do so 
anyway.  
Coggins does not suggest that the Westphalian model of statehood is under threat or 
indeed in need of change. Rather external secession theory recognises the modern and 
influential role of the international community, in particular those actors within it who 
wield the most influence. Recognition therefore, is taken beyond simple 
acknowledgement of any internal criteria and is based on external actors’ own agenda and 
interests.  
A factor highlighted as influencing external recognition is concerns for external security. 
The core of this external influence is based on determinants of strategy and alliance based 
upon considerations of the international security environment and where the secession fits 
into this. Theory anticipates that external states will recognise secession if it increases 
their own security and regional advantages. Throughout this study, security is taken to 
mean a wide agenda of issues outside of only war. These can include economic, political 
and societal sources of security relevant to the case studies. Although it is not possible to 
measure exact levels of security, I will operationalise the concept and provide indicators 
of how advances in security levels should appear.  
External theory believes that it would not be in the best interests of an external state to 
recognise secession if by doing so would reduce their own security interests in the 
secession, home-state or region. For example, if conflict was foreseen to be sparked or to 
spread causing instability, or if a strong ally or military interest would be diminished. 
When turned on the case studies, Somaliland cannot rule out the possibility of a spill-over 
effect from Somalia’s persistent violence, external recognition perhaps serving to spur 
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this on.29 There are insurgent groups who oppose the possibility of a Somalia break-up or 
‘balkanisation’ and other Northern secessions that oppose Somaliland recognition. If it is 
likely that external recognition would plunge Somaliland and possibly surrounding areas 
of high Somali population into unrest, the likelihood of external recognition is reduced.30 
Further unrest would act against external state’s motive to install central authority in 
Somalia. One of the motives for external recognition of South Sudan was to attempt to re-
stabilise a highly volatile area.  
Furthermore, external states may fear a domino-effect in secession movements and new, 
potentially unstable breakaway states that could also destabilise regional order. There 
existed among international and particularly regional actors a fear that recognising South 
Sudan would pave the way for an onslaught in follow-on movements. The Libyan leader 
Col. Gaddafi in 2010 warned that ‘what is happening in Sudan could become a contagious 
disease that affects the whole of Africa.’31 It was noted that the precedent could even open 
up the question of the continuing validity of inherited colonial borders.32  
However, the case demonstrates that there is likely to be a long and practical series of 
stages and criteria to be followed and met for secession to be recognised.33 The large-
scale involvement was itself partly justified by the unlikely chances of an increase in 
secession movements due to the specific circumstances of South Sudan, namely the 
decades of intense violence. The likelihood of opening the sovereignty floodgate, so to 
speak, was not seen to be a credible reason for non-recognition, on the contrary there was 
an influx of external involvement. The fear that by granting Somaliland recognition a 
blueprint to external recognition would be produced has also been portrayed as imaginary 
and counterproductive.34 Even the AU who treat inherited borders as inviolable through 
                                                 
29
 Marchal, ‘A Tentative Assessment’, 389. 
30
 Harmony Project, ‘Al-Qaeda’s (mis)adventures’, 60. 
31
 AFP, ‘Sudan’s Partition to be a “Contagious Disease”’. Leaders of Algeria and Chad have 
made similar statements.  
32
 Jok, ‘Diversity, Unity’. 
33
 Belloni, ‘The Birth of South Sudan’. 
34
 Eggers, ‘When is a State a State?’, 212. 
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the principle of uti possidetis,35 noted at the end of a 2005 fact-finding mission that the 
case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’36  
Tied to this, external secession theory views home-state relations to be influential in 
recognition or non-recognition. Strategically, if a state has a shared interest in the home-
state or is motivated to open or create a forum, Coggins does not believe that it would be 
in that state’s interest to recognise any secession able to disrupt this. It would not seem 
logical to want to weaken a local ally or ‘friend’. Whereas Sudan under al-Bashir’s 
presidency, had been given external states a headache for over a decade by supporting 
terrorist cells and committing atrocities, many states now have a stake in Somalia. The 
TFG was created and is maintained with large outside assistance both in personnel and 
finances. Recognising Somaliland could undermine external efforts to finally create some 
form of stability in Somalia.  
 
Internal Secession Theory 
Internal secession theory disagrees. Simply put, it is a bottom-up approach that claims 
internal factors are most significant in deciding recognition.37 Internal secession scholars 
maintain that effective internal features such as governance institutions, economy, internal 
security and home-state relations should influence external recognition. These factors 
amount to levels of effective domestic authority. 38  It is this umbrella indicator that 
determines which secession is externally recognised. The higher the empirically 
demonstrable level of domestic authority, the more likely secession will be externally 
recognised.   
                                                 
35
 ‘As you possess’. Parties should retain possession of that which they have acquired. In 
African context: borders that a country had at the time of decolonisation must be preserved. Poore, 
‘Somaliland: shackled to a failed state’, 131. 
36
 Eggers, ‘When is a State a State?’, 220. Walls & Kibble, ‘Beyond Polarity’, 47. 
37
 Cunningham, ‘Divide and Conquer’.  
38
 Defined as the organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public 
authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity. Krasner, Organized 
Hypocrisy, 4. 
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While an ambiguity in international law exists, which seems to neither prohibits nor 
encourage secessionist movements,39 theory has been cemented into a number of almost 
checklist type requirements, of which the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States is one of the most cited. This establishes fundamental qualities that a 
state-to-be should have. These are; a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.40 Clearly internal 
make-up is emphasised, even the last external looking qualification is enabled only by 
internal diplomatic capacities.  
Indeed, Rotberg argues that based on internal factors and capacity one can determine the 
strength of a state, ranging from strong to failed.41 Internal secession theory views the 
internal abidance with governance norms and practices as the best way of securing 
recognition, as the international community is more likely to accept a state that will not 
upset the existing order. This inter-state order was built around the autonomous assertion 
of societal-binding authority within a state’s own borders and these borders remaining 
clearly defined. In the case of both states used in this paper, settled borders remain a 
contentious issue. 
While some authors aim to give as broad analysis as possible of internal features,42 within 
internal secession theory there are also more specific strands of internal state factors 
which are thought to be most significant. The anthropological make-up of civilians has 
been given consideration. Bunce asserts that external recognition is more likely if the 
secession is ethnically distinctive, for this gives the secession claim a level of 
cohesiveness. 43  This is relevant to Somaliland, the main Isaaq clan accounting for 
approximately seventy percent of the population. It struggles to find ground with South 
Sudan though, inhabitants comprising of over two hundred ethnic groups.44  
                                                 
39
 Eggers, ‘When is a State a State?’, 216.  
40
 Organisation of American States, 1933, Art. 1. 
41
 Rotberg, When States Fail. 
42
 See Caspersen, Unrecognized States, who argues in favour of a wide-spectrum of internal 
features.  
43
 Bunce, Subversive Institutions.  
44
 Emmanuel, ‘South Sudan’, 94. 
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Similarly, Mancini believes that secession is more likely to be successful when it secures 
minority rights.45  South Sudan may be illustrative of this, the majority Christian and 
African population by no means constitute a uniform society with considerable ethnic and 
linguistic diversity, nonetheless made up a minority compared to the Arab and Muslim 
North.  
Dersso theorises that external recognition is more likely when it is a means of redressing 
serious violations of human rights that were related to the systematic discrimination of a 
population section. 46  Applied to the case studies, almost since original de-colonised 
independence North Sudan had treated the South like second-class citizens, imposing a 
regime of ‘Arabisation’ and Shari ‘a law, 47  whilst also leaving it severely 
underdeveloped.48 Whole villages were forcibly displaced by aerial bombardments and 
scorched earth tactics to make way for foreign oil investors. These series of tragic events, 
as well as more atrocities in the Darfur region of West Sudan meant external recognition 
of the South was seen as possibly the only way to end the relentless violence. 
Others claim that internal institutional empowerment of a particular group or groups is 
paramount in gaining external recognition. Roeder observes that recognition is more 
likely if elites have at their disposal an institutionalised mechanism of political influence 
that helps them to establish political-identity hegemony.49 Scholars such as Licklider put 
forward that a powerful secession movement is more likely to gain recognition, 
particularly if a decisive military victory is gained over an adversary, usually the home-
state.50 In both case studies, no decisive military victory was gained. The SPLA in South 
Sudan had gained the upper-hand on occasions, but complete defeat of one side seemed 
unlikely. Somaliland has not had to militarily engage with Somalia due mainly to its 
virtual non-existence for over two decades, but Somaliland’s standing army would 
certainly hold the upper-hand.    
                                                 
45
 Mancini, ‘Rethinking the Boundaries’. 
46
 Dersso, ‘International Law and the Self-Determination of South Sudan’. 
47
 Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur, 160. 
48
 It received almost nothing of the revenue derived from its oil fields of which South Sudan has 
the third-largest proven oil reserves in Africa. Lacher, ‘South Sudan’, 7. 
49
 Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From. 
50
 Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements’.  
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Once a struggle has been internally settled in terms of outbreaks of violence and at least 
the reduced chance of conflict re-emergence, there would appear little reason not to 
recognise secession.51 This is related to the provision of internal security by the secession. 
Although Somaliland has experienced spouts of violence in the Eastern territories and 
patches of civil war in the early 1990s, its ability to keep clear of the wider Somalia 
conflict is impressive. The conflict between North and South Sudan however, does not 
appear to be settling with conflict along the border consistently imminent.   
Another internal feature referred to is institution and economic capability. Issues 
including underdevelopment, the ability to provide essential services, economic 
functioning and diversity, and institutional reach can amount to a level of domestic 
authority. Higher-levels are associated with sustainability and increased chances of 
external recognition. 52  Analysts highlight the lack of infrastructure and economic 
diversity and Somaliland’s heavy reliance on its diaspora and remittances as areas that 
must be addressed. However, as outlined in Section (1.2), once a state is recognised it can 
begin to benefit from greater monetary services. There exists an unfortunate paradox with 
this internal factor. Without external recognition, international investment and monetary 
flows are limited stunting development, but such development to tackle poverty and 
increase access to basic services is itself seen as necessary by internal theorists and 
external states for recognition.  
As well as economic, others features that currently hinder the development of Somaliland 
and South Sudan include the high-levels of un-employment,53 the lack of media channels, 
particularly those able to reach the rural population,54 and the almost complete lack of 
participation of women in politics as well as their repression within society.55 
Finally, internal theory indicates the importance of relations between secession and its 
home-state. If a peaceful agreement can be made internally which addresses any 
contentious issues there is less reason to doubt the viability of the new state as often the 
most historically controversial and explosive issues are between home-states and 
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secessions. Therefore, strong home-state relations are seen as a viable show of domestic 
authority and should be accompanied by stability.  
In South Sudan, relations with the Khartoum government had been dire for decades. It 
was only after huge international involvement and pressure that the North finally accepted 
Southern separation was inevitable. The absence of a functioning central government in 
Somalia complicates Somaliland’s position. Furthermore, Somaliland’s aspiration for 
external recognition and its unwillingness to attend Somali unification conferences has 
been a stumbling block to international efforts in establishing central governance.56 The 
poor relations are mostly built around differences in outlook though, as opposed to 
chances of militarised exchanges.  
 
 
(3) Hybrid Secession Theory  
While I recognise the gap in existing literature that Coggin’s external secession theory 
provides, I do not believe that bypassing internal factors altogether is in itself, wise. I 
therefore argue for a hybrid theory that will use elements from both external and internal 
secession theory. By doing so, my research will be able to account for a wide range of 
reasons for external recognition or non-recognition. I believe that elements highlighted as 
instrumental for external recognition by internal theory, are likely to be influenced or 
constrained by factors pointed to by external theory, and vice versa.  
In this research I intend to apply and extend both sets of secession theory. Application to 
Somaliland and South Sudan and extension by recognising the reciprocal value of the two 
theories. This more rounded and complimentary approach will allow me to highlight the 
most important factors that help to explain the external recognition of South Sudan but 
not Somaliland, advancing the research question. 
Although it is logical that each secession case should differ in some way, secession 
literature appears to be more interested in providing general rules. Such rules are useful 
for historical patterns and sweeping conclusions, but are less valuable for explaining 
specific examples of external recognition or non-recognition. I intend to depart from this 
                                                 
56
 Bruton, ‘Somalia, A New Approach’, 17. 
 - 21 - 
by testing hypotheses derived from an inclusive hybrid theory to two case studies. Each 
hypothesis expects to illustrate a link between theory and external recognition of 
secession, hoping to isolate factors that should influence external recognition of secession.  
This allows me to advance the research question in two ways. Firstly, which factors 
brought to light by testing the hybrid theory derived hypotheses best explain the external 
recognition of South Sudan but not Somaliland? And secondly, do these factors support 
Coggins’ re-assessment and shifted iteration to an external explanation, or internal 
secession theory? Comments can also be made on the seemingly selective nature of 
external recognition of secession. 
 
 (4) Hypotheses 
This research is thus ultimately interested in what factors make an external state be more 
or less likely to recognise secession. The hybrid nature of the research means I have 
derived the hypotheses from external and internal secession theory. Simply put, external 
explanations are: (1) External Security and (2) Domestic Relations. Internal explanations 
follow: (3) Internal Security, (4) Home-State Relations and (5) Institutions and Economy. 
Throughout the study, my DV remains external recognition, leading to international legal 
sovereignty. Therefore, each hypothesis expects to provide explanatory factors that 
illustrate reasons for recognised secession in South Sudan but non-recognition in 
Somaliland.57  
The hypotheses have not been formed in specific relation to the two case studies. Rather, 
as outlined, they are derived from the two-sided nature of existing secession literature. 
Therefore from the outset when applied to the case studies, I do not necessarily foresee 
that positive causation will be achieved across the board and accept this to be the nature 
of the study. Abiding by prominent areas of theory in the formulation of the hypotheses 
will aid me to establish continuities and divergences between theory and empirics. 
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(4.1) External Hypotheses 
The two hypotheses championing external factors view motive of an external state as 
being the most significant in recognising (or not recognising) secession. This is due, 
argues Coggins, to the interests of the outside actor in advancing their own strategic 
positions and aims either within the secession state or in the region, making secession 
recognition part of their state strategy.  
 
Hypothesis (1) addresses the external security aspect of external secession theory. As 
outlined, security gains weaken the external state’s enemies and thus advances their own 
security position. This can also involve enhanced regional security if this is seen as 
securing external state interests. Therefore, any potential granting of external recognition 
should reflect an external state’s own security situation and considerations.58  
Therefore, hypothesis (1) will be, 
H1. the more recognition increases an external states own security, the more likely it 
is for that state to recognise the secession. 
 
Hypothesis (2) is drawn from the home-state relations facet of external secession theory. 
This notes that if recognition by an external state were to diminish relations with the 
home-state be it politically, economically or militarily, recognition would be less likely. It 
would not be in the interests of an external state to recognise secession if it would only 
serve to reduce their own interests or capabilities.    
I hypothesise that, 
H2. the more likely recognition of secession by an external state would decrease 
relations with the home-state of that secession, the less likely that external state will 
extend recognition. 
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(4.2) Internal Hypotheses 
The hypotheses derived from internal secession theory expect to highlight that internal 
features are the most important for the external recognition (or non-recognition) of 
secession. They point to the creation of an environment from which it is logically derived 
that an external state should look upon the secession more favourably and be more willing 
to recognise it. As noted, internal secession theory believes that the secession state’s level 
of domestic authority is the driving force behind external recognition.  
 
Hypothesis (3) addresses the importance of internal security. This is a traditional notion of 
domestic authority, Max Weber famously deeming the monopoly of force as the driving 
factor behind internal control. 59  Internal theory indicates that settled borders and 
centralised security provision able to reach all citizens should contribute to limited 
chances of (recurring) conflict and should increase chances of external recognition. 
Likewise, if such issues are seen or anticipated to be a problem, it would not be a difficult 
step to predict this would act against the likelihood of external recognition. 
The hypothesis follows as,  
H3. the higher the level of internal security provision, the more likely an external state 
will recognise the secession.  
 
Hypothesis (4) draws from internal secession theory this time, the importance of home-
state relations. If relations are peaceful, internal secession theory believes that a prominent 
area where conflict could breakout is eliminated. This serves to boost internal security as 
desired in hypothesis (3) and should amount to a verifiable level of domestic authority. 
Thus peaceful home-state relations should provide internal stability which should serve to 
increase chances of external recognition, stability being desired by the international 
community. 
I hypothesis that, 
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H4. the more peaceful secession relations are with their home-state, the more likely an 
external state will recognise the secession. 
 
Finally, hypothesis (5) takes into account the internal make-up and capabilities of the 
secession state, serving as an indicator of domestic authority. The higher the capabilities, 
and thus domestic authority, the more likely secession will be externally recognised. As 
shown, internal secession theory has highlighted numerous features that if present and 
functioning, should work in the secession state’s favour. This research has condensed the 
features, leaving two tests of state capabilities,  
(1) The extent and strength of the state’s devolved and decentralised institutions, 
(2) Economic make-up: income and reliance. 
Accordingly the hypothesis will be, 
H5. the stronger the secession’s internal institutions and economy, the more likely it is 
to be externally recognised and international legal sovereignty acquired.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Research Design 
 
(1) Case Selection 
To assess why some secessions are externally recognised while others are not, I will read 
the hybrid theory through two contemporary examples of secession; the unrecognised 
Somaliland and South Sudan, the world’s newest state. Reasons for selecting these two 
cases are numerous; both are located in the Horn of Africa, both are organised around 
ethnic groups and contain a sizeable majority of citizens who are rurally based and largely 
live-stock herders.  
The two cases have also experienced prolonged periods of brutal violence. In Somaliland, 
SNM fighters were engaged in a struggle against Siad Barré’s dictatorship. The instability 
caused by the fighting led to the regime’s collapse in 1991 with SNM officials taking the 
opportunity to declare de facto status from Somalia. It has since established a surprising 
level of stability and governance including a series of democratic elections, yet remains 
unrecognised by any external state. South Sudan resistance fighters (SPLA/M) struggled 
against Northern repression and fought amongst themselves for influence during a war 
that lasted for decades. A ceasefire was agreed in 2005 which contained a clause for a 
Southern referendum concerning independence six years later. In January 2011 the 
referendum took place, resulting in a landslide in favour of independence which external 
states queued-up to recognise.     
Why then, if the two cases feature such similar elements, has one been recognised while 
the other has not? I attempt to provide an answer by applying the hybrid series of 
hypotheses. This should serve to isolate factors that influence external recognition, while 
also providing insight into the effectiveness of each theory when compared to empirical 
realities.  
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(2) Data Collection and Methods  
This thesis will use existing data as the opportunity to collect original data was 
unfortunately unrealistic. The specific availability of numerical data for both cases is 
limited. South Sudan has been an officially recognised state for less than a year and 
Somaliland is not externally recognised meaning many prominent research bodies and 
think-tanks continue to incorporate the state into overall Somalia data. This inclusion is 
not useful to the study as no indication of regional differences would be available. Data 
collection is also notoriously difficult in the states, both having been plagued by decades 
of warfare and lack basic infrastructure in the hinterlands. Instead, I use state policy 
reports and UN and EU official documents. These serve to measure levels of importance 
connected to factors examined in the research, for example security. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
External Secession Theory Application 
 
It has been hypothesised and tested by Coggins that external states, namely ‘Great 
Powers’, hold the key to a secession claims external recognition. It is these powers that 
control if secession is granted international legal sovereignty through recognition or not, 
judging the claim based on their own motives and strategic interests. This may entail that 
a secession state is recognised even though its internal capabilities are weak. Contrarily, a 
secession state may function effectively but provides little strategic interest for external 
states making recognition elusive. Accordingly, contrasts in the level of self-motivated 
involvement by external states are thought to influence external recognition or non-
recognition. This is thought to provide the most significant explanation for isolating 
factors that advance the research question and explains South Sudan’s external 
recognition and not Somaliland’s. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – External Security  
External secession theory highlights the role of security as a motive for external 
recognition. Advancing security interests should influence an external state’s decision to 
recognise secession or not. When reversed, it can be assumed that if external recognition 
would not advance an external state’s security interests, they would be less willing to 
grant external recognition. Thus, my hypothesis, 
H1: the more recognition increases an external states own security, the more likely 
it is for that state is to recognise the secession. 
   
Somaliland 
The main sources of security concern for external powers are twofold. Firstly, the 
domestic and regional threat posed by two Islamic extremist cells, the Harakat al-
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Shabaab al Mujahidin (‘the youth’) and Hizbul Islam, the former having attracted the 
most attention and concern. Secondly, the prospect of a spill-over affect from Somalia not 
only into Somaliland, but also areas of high Somali inhabitants in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
This could cause further mass-instability to the region.     
International engagement with Somaliland has aimed to bolster its security force’s 
abilities to deal with the fluid nature of threat posed by al-Shabaab. The cell was 
officially formed in Somaliland and continues to have a geographical unit covering 
Puntland60  and Somaliland. It maintains a strong and active recruitment drive in the 
North,61 particularly appealing to underrepresented sub-clans and unemployed youths. Its 
goal is ultimately to wage global jihad and to create a strict regime in line with their 
interpretation of the Quran.62 More immediately, the cell seeks the reunification of a 
‘Greater Somalia’63 as an Islamic Emirate.  
The group has outlined its disdain of Somaliland both in its existence as a secession state 
and towards its government, the established democratic system having been deemed as 
blasphemous by their leader.64 In the 2010 elections, the Islamist group threatened that 
Somalilanders would ‘face the consequences’ of casting their ballots, branding anyone 
who did so as ‘unbelievers.’65 These threats were not to be taken lightly, the group had 
already demonstrated their ability to cause unrest in Somaliland through a series of 
suicide-attacks in Hargeisa, 2008 and various assassinations mainly of foreign aid 
workers, as well as the and devastating 2010 Kampala World Cup explosion in Uganda. 
Fortunately this time, these threats did not materialise.  
Somali-bred terrorism has long been on the security agenda of Western governments. It 
was thought that al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists and explosive material had passed through 
Somalia on their way to the 1998 US embassy attacks in Tanzania and Kenya, likely 
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finding a safe-haven in parts of Mogadishu after the attacks. Al-Shabaab has attracted 
more attention this year by formally pledging through a released web-video its allegiance 
to al-Qaeda. Previously, esteemed leaders including Osama bin-Laden had recognised the 
Somali unit, referring to them as the ‘lions of Islam in Somalia.’66  
The threat of a trans-national terrorist attack plotted and perhaps even trained for in the 
parts of North Somalia where central authority is slight (see h3) is treated as a reality. By 
demonstrating their capacity and ambitions to attack outside of North and South Somalia, 
and aligning themselves with a group whose actions eleven years ago continue to 
influence foreign-policy, al-Shabaab have placed themselves firmly on external actors’ 
security radars. The UN recognised the threat in a report that produced evidence linking 
terrorism to the disintegration of the Somali state.67 
External states have interacted with Somaliland officials to address these security issues. 
Ethiopia’s history with Somaliland is long, having harboured SNM bases during the pre-
1991 civil war. It now views Somaliland as a regional ally, against the possibility of 
future attacks, the presence of mutual threat68 has led to increased co-operation in the field 
of security. Ethiopia is also concerned that violence will filter into already unsettled 
border regions where high numbers of Somali nationals reside. 
US military instructors based in Ethiopia have also been actively involved in training 
Somaliland National Intelligence Service (NIS) officers with cooperation starting as early 
as 2003.69 The nature and connection of the threat in Somaliland makes it a priority for 
the US which is keen to find allies for its ‘War on Terror.’ As noted, ‘Somalia’s porous 
borders and undefended coastline make it a prime concern for US policy-makers.’70 
Similarly, the UK has also provided special counter-terrorism training to Somaliland’s 
Criminal Investigation Department.71 The increased cooperation and training has brought 
some success with NIS security forces thwarting at least three plots in 2010, two in the 
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month before the June presidential election. 72  The US has even transferred former 
Guantanamo detainees into the custody of Somaliland’s government,73 and the Seychelles 
reached an agreement where convicted pirates would be transferred to Somaliland prisons, 
clear nods to Somaliland security capacities and to the importance of their well-
functioning. 
External secession theory states that if an external state has a strategic interest or a stake 
in the secession or region, they are more likely to recognise it. Somaliland is strategically 
well placed. The port of Berbera (see figure 1) provides an outlet for the Gulf of Aden 
which leads into Red Sea and harbours lucrative trading opportunities. It  peers across the 
straight to Yemen which has been a source of both military challenges and cooperation 
during the ‘War on Terror’. Somaliland shares a short border with Djibouti and its longest 
one with Ethiopia, a regional partner for many Western states and undoubtedly the 
regional hegemon. Recent reports of natural resource deposits and moderate levels of 
Shari ‘a law implementation, certainly when compared to the United Islamic Courts (UIC) 
that controlled large parts of Somalia from 2005, the regime provides some tempting 
strategic prospects.   
 
South Sudan 
Like Somaliland, external security concerns regarding South Sudan related to terrorism 
and the destabilising effect of conflict. Sudan itself had been on policy-makers agenda as 
a potential threat since the bloodless coup of 1989 which instigated Omar Hassan al-
Bashir as President. The new regime saw themselves as promoters of political Islam and 
began veering towards policies of radicalisation with calls for a global Islamist revolution. 
The President and his close advisors invited members of al-Qaeda including their leader 
Osama bin Laden, 74  and numerous other Islamist groups to live, work and re-locate their 
headquarters and training camps to Sudan.  
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As well as the Middle-East, the US had grave foreign-policy concerns that Sudan may 
emerge as the new Lebanon from where terrorist groups could launch attacks and plan 
operations.75 A US policy-maker deemed the regime ‘a viper’s nest of terrorism’ and it 
was promptly placed on the list of states that sponsor terrorism, meaning it could receive 
no US assistance or investment.76  
This, as well as Khartoum’s support for Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War 
served to cement Sudan’s international isolation. However, the reactionary affect pushed 
Sudan further towards sympathetic regimes, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Libya. This sent shockwaves across the Arab world which feared an expansion of political 
Islam to Egypt and the wider-Horn, and was alarmed by the possibility of military action 
by the West.  
To counter al-Bashir, the US under President Clinton started to support allies in region by 
providing a surplus of military equipment to Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. 77  More 
recently, it appears the possibility of the Khartoum regime harbouring terrorists has not 
been removed from US defence policy, its involvement in South Sudan having led to fears 
of Northern reprisals. When Obama took office, one of his three strategies towards Sudan 
was the continued insurance that a safe-haven for terrorists was not able to be created.78   
A further question raised by the North government’s ever-unpredictable level of 
cooperation is the use of Nile waters. The importance of the issue is such, that it could 
bring Egypt and Ethiopia into conflict with North Sudan, another issue harbouring 
potential for regional instability. Volatile issues leave Middle-Eastern and Asian investors 
with little confidence and insurance of protection.79  
Another area of external security was the detrimental spill-over effect that a return to 
wide-scale conflict in Sudan could have on regional security. The possibility of violence 
can spark reactionary policies such as arms imports and cause a continuing threat to the 
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region.80 The kilometres upon kilometres of unguarded boundaries, of which South Sudan 
shares six, could allow rebel militia, tribal conflict and humanitarian crises to cross-
borders with relative ease. Escalation can also be fuelled by increased strain placed on 
border states from refugees through migration or involuntary displacement. 
 
Findings of External Security 
In the case of Somaliland, the motive for increased security directly and regionally should 
increase the likelihood of external recognition by an external state, and so follows the 
basic tenets of external secession theory. As the empirics show, Somaliland harbours 
strategic importance for the advancement of an external state’s own security against the 
threat of terrorism and regional instability, its significance demonstrated already by the 
present and increasing level of external security orientated involvement. Although 
collaboration in the field of security cannot rule out the chances of spill-over violence, 
Somaliland security forces having already shown their preventative abilities are 
improving. If this fear was a genuine concern then external states could provide more 
cooperation, intelligence sharing and training in the lead-up to recognition, quelling the 
potential for spill-over. The gains of a strong regional ally that would enhance an external 
state’s security appear to outweigh the risk of spill-over violence and, in light of the crisis 
dominated Somalia, should not amount to a significant enough reason for non-recognition.   
The hypothesis has shown an aspect of what external theory expects; a link between 
security motivated policy of external actors and an increase in levels of external security 
involvement with the secession. What it cannot account for is the non-realisation of the 
study’s DV as Somaliland remains unrecognised. The problem for Somaliland is the 
reciprocal nature of external security provisions which mean external states can advance 
their own interests without any concrete guarantees of recognition.  
External state security motives did play a role in the recognition of South Sudan, thus 
bearing out the assumptions of external secession theory. Empirically, security factors 
usually detrimental to external recognition, namely the foreseen spill-over effect of 
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instability, had long passed. This was demonstrated by the devastating conflict in Darfur, 
the poorly guarded and lucid borders from minimal controls meant disruptive militias and 
government forces could take shelter in neighbouring states. The hypothesis must be 
adapted in this case, instead of preventing the spread of conflict in the first place, external 
recognition should be a means to halt further spill-over violence as a result of Sudan’s 
civil war. The cessation of violence was seen as enhancing their security interests in the 
region. The threat of terrorism stemming from North Sudan also continued to be an 
external security concern, highlighted for example by Obama’s Sudan strategies.  
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Hypothesis 2 – Domestic Relations 
Having established that advancements in domestic or regional security concerns of an 
external state can provide motive for secession recognition, I will now assess how the 
chances of external recognition of secession is affected by varying levels of home-state 
relations. As outlined, external secession theory believes that if recognition of secession 
by an external state were to decrease relations with the home-state, reducing any strategic 
interests along the way, that external state’s motive to recognise secession should be 
diminished. Why, asks Coggins, would an external state recognise secession if it is 
detrimental to their own home-state interests? I hypothesise therefore,  
H2: the more likely recognition of secession by an external state would decrease 
relations with the home-state of that secession, the less likely that external state will 
extend recognition. 
 
Somaliland 
I will first assess how the TFG of Somalia is closely associated with external involvement, 
followed by an assessment of further external involvement in the form of an AU 
peacekeeping force. The importance of home-state relations was outlined by the EU, 
which considers ‘the territorial integrity of Somalia an issue to be resolved first and 
foremost among Somalis themselves.’81 
The TFG was created in 2004 at a conference in Nairobi and since Ethiopian forces 
dispersed the UIC between 2005 and 2007, sits as the official government of Somalia. It 
has since been attempting to gradually assert central authority outside of Mogadishu and 
other larger towns. Somalia’s government has received a huge amount of external aid and 
assistance. It is of little surprise therefore, that the TFG, propped up by AMISOM, is 
heavily backed by the US and a withdrawn Ethiopia. This, according to Sturmam, has 
served to elevate the TFG’s status above the self-proclaimed representatives of 
Somaliland who built a state largely from rubble with very little external assistance.82 
                                                 
81
 Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the Period 2008 – 2013, 11. 
82
 Sturman, ‘New Norms, Old Boundaries’, in Pavkovic & Radan, On the Way to Statehood, 77. 
 - 35 - 
Paradoxically, the TFG could not survive without external assistance but is granted full 
diplomatic recognition as a member of the international community.83  
External actors in Somalia are unlikely to want to undermine their own operations and the 
ally of Somalia that they have created. Issues such as piracy are high on the international 
agenda and a strong Somalia is needed to deal with them. As seen, the potential for 
further violence as a result of Somaliland recognition cannot be ruled out as it effectively 
ends any dream of a ‘Greater Somalia’. This vision reaches beyond the Somali border into 
areas of Kenya and Ethiopia. The last thing external states want is clan-based mobilisation 
centred on Somaliland recognition, this could provide mass-instability. Even though 
Somaliland has provided a quite exceptional level of stability within its borders, while 
secession is viewed through the lens of a security threat, recognition by those involved in 
the creation and maintenance of the TFG is unlikely. Furthermore, the US and UK are 
fearful that the lack of Arab state84 and Arab League support for Somaliland’s cause could 
damage their ties with the Middle East.  
That is not to say that external ‘functional relations’ have not been built with Somaliland. 
The US ‘continue[s] to regularly engage with Somaliland as a regional administration,’85 
having even invited top Kulmiye party ministers to Washington in 2010.86 It has hosted 
delegations from Pakistan, Djibouti, Denmark and Kuwait and has received continental 
support from South Africa, Rwanda and Zambia.87 
Ethiopia’s military show of strength to repel the UIC was replaced with the world’s most 
expensive peace-keeping force, AMISOM.88 This force continues to engage with rebel 
groups and regional strongmen with no interest in being brought under the TFG, as well 
as al-Shabaab fighters (see above) who remain ideologically opposed to the Western 
puppet-government that sides with their religious enemy, Ethiopia.  
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South Sudan 
As shown in h1, external state’s relations with North Sudan had not been positive. 
Harrowing reports came to light as to the scale of atrocities committed by the regime of 
al-Bashir, now indicted by the ICC on homicide charges, against the South. As early as 
November 1993 the US House of Representatives had recognised the right of South 
Sudanese secession89 and since then had remained committed to ‘bringing stability to 
Sudan.’90 
Although relations with the North after the end of the Cold War were poor, it did not stop 
the US under Bush Jrn. elevating Sudan near the top of his foreign-policy agenda. Joined 
later by the UK and Norway (referred to collectively as ‘the Troika’), they attempted to 
engage with the regime in a constructive and realistic manner. The mediating states, for 
example, did not insist that hostilities ceased before arbitrating talks between the two 
combatants. While this may seem like folly when placed alongside the scale of violence, 
it was a compromise that made sure Khartoum was not pushed too hard, the possibility of 
an increase in violence remaining very real. The US also made sure that recognition issues 
remained fixed on South Sudan and not extended to include Darfur.91 During periods of 
intense deadlock, President Bush rang al-Bashir personally on twelve occasions to 
maintain pressure.92  
The US conveyed to the North that if they cooperated peacefully with the South’s 
transition, sanctions may be lifted and full diplomatic recognition restored.93 The North 
desperately wanted to end its pariah status and divert attention away from Darfur. Al-
Bashir also feared US military power, having been previously demonstrated in Sudan 
when the Clinton administration bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum and more 
recently by the invasions of Afghanistan then Iraq.94  
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Eventually, sustained Troika pressure alongside waning citizen support for a war that was 
sapping Northern revenue and dominating expenditure, led to al-Bashir and SPLM leader 
John Garang signing the CPA. The scale of the conflict was undoubtedly a key factor in 
what was considered a foreign-policy triumph for the Christian leader. Bush had seen it as 
his Christian duty 95  to aid the peoples of South Sudan who had been religiously 
persecuted for centuries, a regime of ‘Arabisation’ being forced upon them. Importantly 
for Bush, the CPA held that Shari ‘a law only applied to Muslims and that English was 
restored as the South’s national language.  
 
Findings of Domestic Relations 
In the case of Somaliland, it appears the relations between external states and the Somalia 
home-state under the TFG provides direct support for the hypothesis. Somaliland’s 
unrecognised status is exactly what external secession theory expects the empirical reality 
to be. External theory does not expect recognition to act against the interests of the 
external state. In this case, it is clearly not in the interests of external states, after having 
poured time and resources into creating then installing the TFG in Mogadishu in the hope 
it can drag Somalia out of a twenty-one year black hole, to then recognise a secession that 
breaks-up Somalia. As shown in h1, partition may be associated with security threats 
which are also likely to act against external state interests.  
Despite this representing the fourteenth attempt at establishing a Somali central authority, 
the level of international cooperation and diplomatic exertion between states and IGOs, 
the huge financial sums in creating and maintaining the TFG and ANISOM as well as the 
regional military effort to disband the UIC, accumulate for the TFG to be seen as 
presenting a departure and real hope for at least a basic level of nation-wide stability.  
Therefore, by recognising Somaliland, a secession that the TFG and every form of Somali 
authority since 1991 opposes, external states perceive their own chances of finally 
accomplishing Somali stability and creating a regional ally able to eliminate external 
security threats, to be diminished. Equally, by recognising Somaliland current 
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peacekeeping forces are likely to become even more stretched to pre-empt any potential 
violence. This could lead to further unrest in the South with local strongmen ceasing their 
chance. Thus, external recognition may lead to a situation where external states do not 
reap the benefits of their own efforts.  
Relations with South Sudan’s home-state on the other-hand do not appear to have played 
a linking role in external recognition of the South. As outlined, al-Bashir had 
diplomatically out-cast himself and was firmly held responsible for numerous counts of 
human suffering. The international community was more interested in maintaining 
constant pressure to make sure the Northern government held its part of the bargain and 
allowed the January 2011 referendum to take place. Indeed, in September 2010 at the UN 
in New York virtually every state-representative lined up behind the South to insist the 
referendum was held on time.96  
In this instance, external secession theory used to construct the hypothesis cannot attribute 
domestic relations between external states and North Sudan as a causal factor related to 
the external recognition of South Sudan, or at least not in the way it expected. The theory 
has initially failed because empirical home-state relations were poor, meaning the motive 
for external recognition was unhindered. 
However, when the hypothesis is reversed a causal explanation for external recognition 
can be observed. Thus as opposed to strong relations decreasing the chances of 
recognition as shown in Somalia, North Sudan suggests that poor relations with the home-
state should serve to eliminate an obstacle to external recognition, paving the way for 
unhindered action. External states did not affiliate North Sudan as a friend or ally. Instead, 
cooperation was maintained out of necessity and seen as a way of accommodating an end 
to hostilities. This may not mean that secession chances of external recognition are 
automatically increased per se, rather a sizable obstacle should have been removed. This 
is in line with external theory as the external state can act as it wishes. Unfortunately, 
testing this is outside the remits of the paper. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Internal Secession Theory Application 
 
As outlined, the second theory pertaining to external recognition of secession emphasises 
the significance of internal factors in explaining whether secession is externally 
recognised or not. Theoretically, the presence of certain internal features should increase 
chances of external recognition. As in the previous Chapter, a series of hypotheses 
derived from prominent features of theory will be applied to the case studies in an attempt 
to advance the study’s research question of what factors explain South Sudan’s external 
recognition and not Somaliland’s.   
Each hypothesis expects to show that if a verifiably high-level of domestic authority is 
present chances of external recognition and the acquisition of international legal 
sovereignty should be positively influenced. Internal secession theory depicts non-
recognition to stem from weak-levels of domestic authority. 
   
Hypothesis 3 – Internal Security 
Internal security should be linked to more effective domestic authority which influences 
external recognition. Contrarily, if a secessionist claim is not able to secure its borders or 
cannot provide security to its citizens, this show of weak internal security should reduce 
the likelihood of external recognition. It is these two features; borders and security 
provision, which this hypothesis will use to test internal security and thus domestic 
authority.  
I hypothesise, 
H3: the higher the level of internal security provision, the more likely an external 
state will recognise the secession.  
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It will be shown that settling official borders97 with neighbouring states provides tensions 
in each case, while in South Sudan the level of security provision was particularly 
hampered by the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW).       
 
Somaliland 
Somaliland broke-away from Somalia along the same borders as when it originally gained 
independence from the British Empire in 1960. Despite these relatively clear claimed 
borders, there lies a contested region between Somaliland and Puntland that has caused 
numerous tensions and occasions of conflict between the two breakaway states. These 
tensions and brief clashes have resulted in shifting control over Sool Sanaag and Cayn 
(also known as ‘Ayn’, SSC) regions.98 Any limited authority in territories of self-declared 
control can undermine the territorial authority of Somaliland and also its political integrity, 
as the subjects of these hinterlands cannot be forced under their control.99 
The disputed areas have experienced intermittent clashes, with tensions reaching boiling-
point and igniting into military confrontation on several occasions. Most noteworthy were 
the collisions at the end of 2003 and in 2004 over settlement control between Somaliland 
and Puntland troops. In October 2007 Somaliland’s troops seized back the town of Las 
Anod in Sool (see figure 2 in Annex).100 Escalation appears consistently possible in the 
militarised zones, with further violence flaring up in 2009 following a senior Somaliland 
military official’s death after a road-side bomb. More recently in late 2010 and early 2011 
there were clashes in the Buuhoodle border area between SSC militia backed by Puntland 
and Somaliland troops. The clashes reflect historically rooted claims over the territories 
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and the inhabitants’ clan-affiliations and have reportedly sparked a further increase in 
military spending.101  
Conflict is spurred on by competition for water resources between local clans and for 
natural gas reserves between the two secession states. Tensions also accelerated into 
violence in August 2011 despite a tentative cease-fire since March 2011 and a June 2011 
reconciliation conference.102 There have been positive developments within the conflict 
which reflect the region’s history for dispute resolution. For example the 2011 peace 
accord involved exchanging prisoners of war. 
It seems that only when an official and settled border is fully accepted by all parties can a 
cessation in tensions be realised. Resolution though, will not be simple and may require 
international mediation, but while no external recognition has been extended to 
Somaliland, these prospects are not available. Any ongoing violence or potential for 
border related conflict is, according to the hypothesis, likely to cement external hesitance. 
The fact the UNSG highlights the clashes in his regional security reports, is an example of 
the negative impact and extensive coverage that border violence attracts, even if full-scale 
war is unlikely.  
While Somaliland has managed to veer clear of wider Somalia conflicts and upheaval, 
internal security concerns have stemmed mainly from the terrorist cell al-Shabaab. As 
shown, the group has vocally and violently stressed their objection to any secession state 
within Somalia. The democratic institutions of Somaliland (see h5.1) are portrayed to be 
imitations of Christian and Jewish ‘Western ways’, able to provide very little for Islamic 
Somalilanders. The cell has highlighted the continuingly high unemployment rates and 
poor infrastructure of Somaliland as evidence of this.103 Even President Silyano holds ‘no 
doubt that we will [remain] a target for terrorists.’104 
However, Somaliland has been able to attract attention for its efforts in countering 
security threats, UN investigators reporting that Somaliland security forces were able to 
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maintain order throughout most of Somaliland’s territory. 105  The NIS has made 
significant strides in preventing attacks and identifying adversaries while a 15,000 strong 
standing army is well-trained. 106  Continuing such strides, notes Zenn, is an ongoing 
opportunity to show Somaliland’s developed domestic authority capabilities which should 
deflect further attacks in itself and attract further international security cooperation.107 
 
South Sudan 
The one hundred and twenty-five page CPA document of 2005 promoted reconciliation 
and was full of promise. However, implementation would be challenging considering the 
precarious state of South Sudan’s borders. Of the South’s six borders, it was undoubtedly 
the border shared with North Sudan that remained the most contentious.    
The proposed 7,000km border that would separate the North from the South was 
described as now the most combustible fault line in Africa.108 Although it was to become 
an international border, full demarcation was not completed by the eve of independence 
with only eighty percent having been officially settled.109 Rather it was suspected that 
Khartoum had been reluctant to settle the borders as ambiguity and associated agitation 
allowed for greater influence over border oil fields.110 The provision of security was also 
exacerbated by the continuingly loose border controls which allowed for relatively free 
movement of militias and as a result, instability.  
As well as borders, the ability of South Sudan’s forces to provide security to its citizens 
was seriously hindered by the proliferation and continued availability of SALW. The 
possibility of tensions boiling over and violence remerging was continuingly made all the 
more possible by the estimated 720,000 SALW possessed by the South Sudanese civilian 
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population.111 South Sudanese security forces in the same period were estimated to have 
held 200,000 small arms, leaving them firmly outgunned.112  
The militarisation of entire communities113 during the civil wars caused mass-insecurities, 
sparked rivalries and meant the possibility of escalatory reprisal over inter-community 
and seasonal resources competition was persistent.114  The scale of the problem truly 
emerged when one considers the population of South Sudan to have been approximately 
8.3 million115 at the time of the January 2011 referendum, of which 4.35 million were 
eligible to vote.116 This suggests that one out of every twelve of the overall population and 
one out six of those eligible to vote, not only possessed a SALW at the time of external 
recognition, but also the option to re-ignite conflict and destabilise authority.  
South Sudan’s government efforts to disarm after the CPA were almost always viewed as 
an attempt to punish or control a certain ethnic group, meaning efforts served only to 
cause a further escalation of tensions and push internal security further afield. 
Disarmament was also rarely replaced with the guarantee of civilian safety and security 
through intervention in case of violence. The South’s security force and army, the SPLA, 
were slow to set out due to a lack of organisation and infrastructure. It could barely 
mobilise to more than two locations and usually lacked sufficient and timely information 
about the incident. Nor was it a monopolistic force, the military elite remained deeply 
divided which led to further inefficiencies and breakaway militias.  
When it did react, its heavy-handed responses won them little respect and could generate 
more sympathy for renegade militias. 117  Remote communities’ security therefore, 
remained ensured by their own means.118 This had an escalatory effect which further 
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decreased internal security, as other groups or bomas (villages) in the area were 
incentivised to take up or keep their arms to be able to deter attacks and protect their 
communities from looting and hostilities. 
The CPA Ceasefire Agreement was meant to address this through a ‘Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration’ (DDR) programme for militias and security forces. 
Eventually starting in 2009, it prohibited ‘the replenishment of ammunition, weapons and 
other lethal or military equipment’ within the agreed ceasefire zone. This zone 
ambitiously included the heavily contested town of Abyei and the Southern Kordofan and 
Blue Nile regions (see figure 5).119 However, due to the high stakes in these areas, namely 
being part of the North or South of Sudan, an arms race was reportedly sparked with the 
GoSS having actively boosted its arms acquisitions on the international market in blatant 
violation of UNSC arms embargos and the aims of the CPA. 120  State diversions of 
financial and physical resources also served to decrease internal security. 
Both government and treaty failures allowed heavily-armed militias to prop-up regional 
strongmen and roam the countryside virtually unchecked. At least seven rebel militias had 
officially declared their opposition to Juba,121 the possession of SALW and the failures of 
state security provision meant they could make demands, usually for inclusion in the 
decision-making process or for a cut of natural resources, through threats of 
destabilisation.  
 
Findings of Internal Security 
This hypothesis expected there to exist a link between internal security and external 
recognition. To test internal security, two key areas were assessed. These served to 
operationalise the concept of security which, if proven to be at a high-level, should lead to 
increased chances of external recognition. I find that the two cases provide divergent 
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results but that both disprove the hypothesis as little evidence can be found of a causal 
link between internal security and external recognition. In sum, the level of security 
provision in Somaliland is high yet it remains unrecognised, while the level of internal 
security in South Sudan was dire between signing the CPA and time of recognition in 
2011 but this provided no hindrance.  
In Somaliland, the central territorial grey-areas in dispute provide moments of tension and 
conflict, but large-scale mobilisation of troops sufficient for all-out warfare has not 
occurred and does not seem likely to do so. The last thing Somaliland wants is to enter the 
public-eye for the wrong reasons, namely warfare, especially as any conflict is likely to be 
associated with Somalia’s own conflict; a well-known example of state failure and 
instability. 
The theory derived hypothesis should be in its element in the case of Somaliland, a 
secession state which is able to provide levels of internal security that even some 
recognised surrounding states cannot. The outcome of continued non-recognition is 
unexpected when internal secession theory is put against empirical realities, Somaliland’s 
internal security should have influenced the realisation of external recognition. While this 
is not the case, internal security provision has not gone without notice and the hypothesis 
should not be discarded. The level of stability has allowed for increased external 
involvement from states with external security concerns, as the findings of h1 have shown. 
While there is no obligation for involvement to be accompanied with external recognition, 
these concerns are very much related to those of Somaliland officials and should serve to 
further increase internal security. 
The post-CPA period in South Sudan demonstrates that unsettled borders and weak 
security provision had both resulted in tensions and increased chances of reoccurring 
conflict, especially considering the value still placed in SALW as a means of ensuring 
survival. South Sudan provides an empirical divergence from Somaliland’s high internal 
security, as it could only muster low-levels of internal security yet proceeded to acquire 
external recognition. It seems the security provision facet of internal secession theory 
cannot explain the realisation of the DV, external recognition. If theory was followed, it 
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would have prescribed that the poor internal security situation should have causally 
affected non-recognition of South Sudan.     
In reality, the CPA had provided a series of measures to counter internal security. 
Implementation would be slow and trust both among and between Southern ethnic tribes 
as well as with North Sudan would take time. Nonetheless, for all their flaws the 
disarmament, border measures and UNMISS peace-keeping force established a building 
block which external states could only hope would develop. Thus, non-recognition over 
internal security provision remained unlikely.  
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Hypothesis 4 – Home-State 
Continuing from the first internal hypothesis addressing levels of internal security, 
hypothesis (4) is often entwined with secession conflict, that is, secession relations with 
their home-state. As set out in Chapter One, it is theorised that if secession – home-state 
relations are peaceful or at least stable, this should increase the likelihood of external 
recognition. This is due to the elimination of a likely source of conflict, serving to 
increase stability; a confirmed sign of domestic authority. To test this facet of internal 
secession theory against the case studies, the following hypothesis has been drawn,  
H4: the more peaceful secession relations are with their home-state, the more likely 
an external state will recognise the secession. 
 
Somaliland  
Somaliland makes no attempt to hide that its ultimate goal is external recognition. In 
current President Silanyo’s words, ‘I make no secret of the fact that my Government’s 
ultimate goal is full international recognition of Somaliland’s independence as a sovereign 
state.’ 122  Nonetheless, relations with the home-state of Somalia have been, and will 
continue to be, rocky at best. Many Somalilanders can still recall the disproportionate 
suffering they endured under Siad Barre’s military regime, intensive bombardments 
leaving 55,000 dead in the Hargeisa capital alone.123  
The Somali home-state however, has long yearned for the reunification of ‘Greater 
Somalia’ making any in-house breakaway contrary to its historic goal. Both the TNG and 
the TFG have asserted claims over Somaliland,124 the Federal Charter of the TFG even 
stating that Somalia’s borders are ‘inviolable and indivisible,’125 asserting its position of 
non-cooperation with secession quite clearly. Recently, the TFG proposed that it should 
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control Somaliland’s reconstruction aid from the UNDP, a clearly unappealing prospect 
for secession ministers.126 
Indeed, Somalia appears to hold a political veto over Somaliland aspirations. The 
secession state has been described by the International Crisis Group as ‘hostage to events 
over which it has very little control,’ 127  referring to Mogadishu’s seemingly 
uninfringeable position. The problem for Somaliland is the influence a home-state can 
wield, especially one that has attracted so much foreign intervention over a series of two 
decades, as shown in h2. This means Somaliland governmental achievements, particularly 
since since the overwhelming 2001 referendum that constitutionally supported secession 
from Somalia, go unheeded. The rickety TFG seems intent that Somaliland will remain 
part of Somalia ‘forever’, to quote President Yusuf.128 Any chance of recognition is also 
tied to Somali suspicions of Ethiopia’s involvement with Somaliland, fearful of a satellite 
state being established by their historic rivals.  
 
South Sudan  
Relations with Khartoum after the signing of 2005 CPA continued to be thwarted by 
inflammatory policies, mistrust and fear from both sides. Tensions with the North had 
continued to be spurred on by allegations that the North was creating proxies by arming 
leaders and rebels in the South whose loyalty remained to the North, with the blatant 
intentions of destabilising the South and stalling border demarcation. 129  Equally, the 
North accused the GoSS of supporting border rebels and Darfur insurgency groups. 
Although neither side was looking for a full-scale return to conflict, there existed a very 
real possibility that the explosive nature of pocketed border disputes and high running 
emotions could lead to the South being dragged back into full scale conflict involuntarily.  
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The North, just months before independence was to be declared in the South, occupied the 
highly contentious border-town of Abyei, forcing 100,000 citizens to flee. Tensions were 
reaching boiling-point to the extent that the UNSC demanded the withdrawal of forces.130 
Khartoum also rejected the Abyei Boundary Commission, designed to finally resolve the 
issue.  
Although in February 2011, President al-Bashir officially accepted the referendum results 
with substantial external pressure, the regime saw the actual implementation of the CPA 
as threat to its interests and employed blatant stalling tactics. In June 2011 for example, a 
Framework Agreement on various areas was signed and then rejected a few days later by 
President al-Bashir.  
Outside of territory, other issues to be solved and that continued to fuel tensions were the 
transit fees for the South’s oil exports which went through the North, the citizenship of 
those living outside of their native state and the rights to cross-border movement. The 
South’s vulnerability, drawn from its heavy reliance on imports from the North, was 
shown when Khartoum blocked most trade to Northern regions of the South in May 2011. 
This caused an economic shock, and the choked supply-lines created a food-shortage and 
a sharp increase in prices of existing food stocks.131 The mentality of many Northern Arab 
elites also hinders relations with the term a’bid still used to refer to Southerners, meaning 
low-caste black slave.132 
 
Findings of Home-State 
In the case of Somaliland, the results from the hypothesis are multi-faceted. Relations 
between Somaliland and Somalia if taken at face value are peaceful. While it is evident 
that Somaliland’s relations with Mogadishu are politically poor, neither recognising the 
other’s established authority, the two are living side-by-side in relative peace with neither 
state foreseeing any definable advantage in carrying out military action against the 
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other.133 Indeed, there has been no military confrontation since Somalia collapsed and 
Somaliland simultaneously declared independence in 1991. Somaliland officials realise 
that if military engagement were to take place, it would involve one of the key holders to 
recognition; the AU through its ANISOM task-force. This should serve to disprove the 
hypothesis as although a link exists, the result has not been external recognition.  
But the hypothesis puts forward that the more peaceful the relations, the higher the 
chances of external recognition. So although no state of deadly brinkmanship or mobilised 
troops exists, the empirics show that the level of peace is low. Therefore, in this instance 
the hypothesis can account for Somaliland non-recognition as although peace exists, the 
level of it is poor and constantly undermined by political differences. And while relations 
may be externally peaceful but the political undercurrents remain stern, internal secession 
theory foresees that security concerns may arise which could reduce the levels of 
domestic authority. So the fact the hypothesis can account for the peaceful yet poor 
scenario, internal secession theory holds true and prescribes Somaliland’s status to be 
correct. Only when relations are improved will external recognition become more likely.  
With South Sudan, peaceful home-state relations were non-existent. Any inkling of 
genuine ceasefire instigated by the CPA was almost always undone by border 
mobilisation and escalatory policies. According to internal secession theory these dismal 
relations should have served to stunt the recognition of South Sudan.  
The empirical realities are the undoing of this internal explanation. When the CPA six 
year interim period between 2005 and 2011 ended without ‘making unity attractive’ to the 
South,134 the external pressure placed on Khartoum to stick to its promise of a referendum 
was immense. When the referendum results were equally immense, Khartoum for all its 
stalling tactics had no choice but to recognise the Juba government. On top of this, the 
years of intense violence and persecution as well scores of unsettled issues had caused 
such a rift between the territories that chances of peaceful relations would have continued 
to be extremely unlikely. So internal cannot provide a link between dire home-state 
relations and Southern external recognition. A possible explanation for the regardless 
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recognition of South Sudan was the creation of the CPA which was thought, or rather 
hoped, to have had been enough to ensure peace. 
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Hypothesis 5 – Institutions and Economy  
So far this internal explanations Chapter has examined internal security provision and 
peaceful home-state relations. My final hypothesis seeks to build on these by taking into 
account internal makeup of the secession through assessing institutions and economy. 
These connect to the DV of external recognition for it is expected that the more advanced 
a state’s internal make-up, the more able it should be to provide effective authority. 
Accordingly, the more willing external states should be in extending recognition and 
international legal sovereignty. Therefore, I hypothesise, 
H5. the stronger the secession’s internal institutions and economy, the more likely it 
is to be externally recognised.  
The hypothesis will be divided according to the two factors that serve to assess the extent 
of domestic authority in the two states: 
(5.1) The extent and strength of the state’s devolved and decentralised institutions, 
(5.2) Economy: income and reliance. 
 
Somaliland 
5.1 Institutions 
The June 2010 democratically voted Presidential transition was decided by a mere margin 
of eighty votes (0.01%). It was deemed by observers as being free and fair and resulted in 
no bloodshed, an impressive feat for most parts of Africa and a real show of institutional 
strength that ‘should not be taken for granted.’ 135  It also demonstrated a political 
cohabilitation as the opposition candidate Mr. Silyano won the election with the Kulmiye 
party.136 This is not the first time Somaliland has been highlighted for its elections, in 
2003 they were deemed some of the freest and most transparent ever held in the Horn of 
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Africa.137 It seems that Somaliland has constructed a functioning government from the 
bottom up, on its own and with little outside assistance.138 
The disputed Central regions discussed in h4 are also institutionally and politically the 
weakest. Four districts of Sool and Eastern Sanaag (see figure 2) did not vote in 2002, 
meaning elected councils were established in only nineteen of the twenty-three 
Somaliland districts. This was significant as no local authority respected the government 
in Hargeisa. It also meant that the areas did not see a lot of Somaliland’s international aid 
and government expenditure, even though they are often the worst hit by drought.139 
Similarly in 2003, presidential elections did not take place in two districts of Eastern 
Sanaag and three of Sool.140 By 2005, Hargeisa authorities asserted that a Somaliland civil 
administration existed across eighty percent of their declared territory,141  the other twenty 
percent representing these grey areas. Residents in these areas have highlighted their 
concern with the dominance of the Isaaq clan in Somaliland governance, leaving some 
Harti feeling marginalised and underrepresented.142  
Apart from these areas, Somaliland’s institutions reach throughout its territory and have 
had no attachment to Somalia since de facto status was declared in 1991, being devolved 
and detached from Mogadishu. The institutional make-up consists of an eighty-two seat 
lower house for which members are directly elected for five-year terms (first election was 
held in 2005) and an eighty-two seat upper house (Guurti) in which members are 
indirectly elected by local communities for six-year terms. The powers in Somaliland are 
separate, with the complete independence of the judiciary. This remained despite the 
application of (Sunni) Shari ‘a law announced in 2006, although this has been modest in 
                                                 
137
 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 86. 
138
 Ibid, 105. 
139
 Such as in 2004. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 199 & 201. 
140
 More recent elections also showed a poor turnout in these areas. The nomadic life is far more 
prominent in these Eastern areas than in the West. Although voting efforts are being made to 
incorporate rural populations, a lack of infrastructure such as roads greatly hinders this. Hansen & 
Bradbury, ‘Somaliland: A New Democracy’, 469. 
141
 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 232. 
142
 Isaaq makes seventy percent of population. Indeed, among some of the Gadabursi, Harti 
and ’Iise sub-clans, attachment to Somaliland is much weaker, some expressing it as an Isaaq project 
from which they feel politically and economically excluded. Ibid, 251. 
 - 54 - 
implementation as Somaliland does not want to attract UIC sympathisers and deter 
Ethiopian support. Somaliland has also signed Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Somaliland’s institutional make-up has been portrayed as desirable143 for it has involved 
the formation of a hybrid regime. On the one hand there exists a constitutionally based 
democracy, while on the other there continues a traditional clan-based social structure. It 
has been termed as a struggle of compromise between the Westphalian state concept and a 
pastoral system.144 This innovative endeavour has been an internal and indigenous process 
and has so far, produced a durable system of governance.  
However, it has not yet been substantially placed under strain, meaning it could be 
insufficient to deal with problems of an international scale.145 Concerns have arisen about 
the series of electoral delays. President Riyale, elected in 2003, had postponed elections to 
the Upper House and extended his term by four years in 2006, delaying calls for elections 
in 2008 and 2009 due to security reasons. Although the 2010 Presidential election 
‘reflected the will of the people’, legislative elections were again delayed in both houses 
afterwards.146  
It has also been noted that the constitutionally written three party system was supposed to 
encourage multi-clan alliances, but that at the local and rural-level people continue to vote 
along clan lines.147 There remains then, a real potential for Somaliland’s infant and home-
grown democratic system to house clan aligned influences and provide temptations to 
elites not to follow the rules, especially when they have a clan-aligned following which 
offers support regardless of exploits. There have also been reports of restricted freedom of 
expression in Somaliland, overly-critical journalists and activists arrested, newspapers and 
television channels temporarily shut-down and public demonstrations having been banned 
in 2009, although this is now easing up.  
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South Sudan 
Institutional reach to rural inhabitants, many of whom had become accustomed to armed 
struggle or threat of conflict, as a means with which to negotiate pockets of power-sharing 
and local structures,148  continued to be exceptionally challenging for South Sudanese 
representatives to instigate. Local structures tended to involve politicisation along ethnic 
lines and clan sentiments, invoking more a sense of citizenship for tribe than country. 
This system had existed for centuries without any substantial governance of borders. The 
integration between towns and hinterlands was also virtually non-existent which made for 
centre vs. periphery problems, an issue that had contributed to South Sudan’s 
discrimination for decades. Finally, the absence of accountable local governance 
institutions and structure contributed to escalatory tensions. The absence of territorial 
control meant that identifiable and consistent legal institutions were not present 
throughout the South at the time of external recognition. 
The CPA had turned the SPLM into South Sudan’s ruling party with its own semi-
autonomous government, and the SPLA into its official and independent standing army.149 
The two had been plagued by a multitude of historically rival factions though, becoming 
hierarchical and rank-centric. State resources and institutions were used to build clientelist 
structures based on clan lines, becoming patronage and largely exclusionary 
instruments.150 Governmental and administrative structures were nonetheless set-up at the 
general level in ten states, but the local level remained neglected as ‘traditional 
authorities’ continued representing the principal source of authority in bomas.151 The CPA 
thus created an asymmetrical federation. The South was now represented in the 
Government of National Unity, gaining twenty-eight percent of seats and the vice-
Presidency through Salva Kiir. Despite a temporary withdrawal from the power-sharing 
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agreement in 2007 by the South followed by a deadly round of military brinkmanship, 
later in the year ministers submitted by the vice-President were sworn into office.152 
In 2010 the first multi-party national election in over twenty-four years were held 
throughout both Sudan’s (albeit one year after initially scheduled), electing presidential, 
parliamentary and regional representatives. They were carried out among numerous 
instances of vote rigging and intimidation and in the lead-up the South rejected the census 
figures produced by the North,153 but in a show of relative institutional capacity the results 
were accepted by both states. In the South, President Kiir reaffirmed his majority and 
President al-Bashir held on in the North. Although there appeared to have been little sign 
of opposition parties based on actual political programmes, rather narrow-based interest 
groups, after the election President Kiir promised the post-independence government 
would include all political forces and attempts were made to provide posts for the 
losers.154  
Integration provided a test of institutional capacities. Former South Sudanese members of 
the National Assembly in Khartoum were appointed as members of the National 
Legislative Assembly in Juba, swelling membership by half. The SPLA absorbed 14,000 
fighters into their ranks and payroll, having been previously paid by the North.155 Citizen 
returnees after 2005 also posed a consideration challenge with more than 340,000 
returning to the South since October 2010 alone, posing real questions over the 
sustainability of resources and social structures.156 According to the UN, 1.5 – 2 million 
Southerners continue to be displaced in the North, reluctant to return due to fears of 
uncertainty and the risk of losing investments.157 These must be addressed and rights of 
displaced citizens clarified, despite the strain re-integration will place on the new state. 
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5.2 Economy 
Somaliland 
Somaliland has made impressive strides in developing its economic capacity, but remains 
cripplingly underdeveloped. At the time of self-declared separation in 1991 Hargeisa had 
barely ten percent of its structures intact 158  with ‘all public utilities and services’ 
destroyed. 159  Unemployment continues to hover at around eighty percent and only 
twenty-two percent of adults are literate.160 Further investment is desperately needed for 
Somaliland to economically diversify and be less dependent on remittances from diaspora 
communities. This still constitute the largest source of national revenue by far the reliance, 
argues Bradbury, serves only to create a false-economy, hide high unemployment levels, 
discourage efforts at local production and can potentially create internal divisions from 
unbalanced benefits among clans.161  
Outside of remittances, Somaliland’s economy is also reliant on cattle and camel livestock 
trade and on qaat consumption and import. 162  A limited economic outlet makes 
Somaliland prone to shocks in the market, worryingly demonstrated when Saudi Arabia 
for nine years and Egypt permanently, stopped importing livestock. Somaliland’s 
government revenues collapsed from USD 45 to 27 million in 1998 as a direct result. 163 
However, Somaliland acts in a restricted sphere. It is prohibited from joining the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund and from gaining direct budgetary support.164 
Beyond IOs, regional or international investment is also discouraged due to the 
uncertainty caused by a lack of insurance and the unreliability of financial institutions 
serving to constrain trading practices. It seems the business community is less willing to 
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invest while it remains legally joined to Somalia due to the perceived vulnerability drawn 
from its counter-part’s persistent instability.  
The lack of bilateral technical assistance and loan options makes the cost of living higher 
as local companies cannot always import goods directly.165 Therefore, Somaliland cannot 
borrow, attract substantial outside investors and is denied access to significant multilateral 
development aid all of which, according to Poore, disables it from playing a politically 
constructive role in the political affairs of North-East Africa.166 Access to funds would 
free up resources that can otherwise be used for state-building.167  
However, Somaliland is trying to redress this by tempting foreign investors with the 
prospect of paying no tax for the first three years and afterwards only having to pay ten 
percent on profits, which can also be freely repatriated as well as full compensation for 
any expropriations.168 
There is little doubt that the ‘absence of recognition of Somaliland’s status [....] hinder[s] 
its economic development.’169 However, while loans and other forms of fiscal assistance 
from IOs are not available, Somaliland’s government must concentrate on pressing issues. 
It currently diverts approximately eighty percent of its budget on administrative and 
security costs, of which fifty percent pays for military and police salaries alone and only 
ten percent of the budget is spent on social spending, leaving very little left over for re-
investment.170 
In 2009, Somaliland is estimated to have received USD 79 million in aid. When compared 
to the estimated USD 200 million the same year in remittances, it is a tiny figure. 
Furthermore, because aid cannot be transferred directly to government bodies due to non-
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recognition, it must go through agencies with money seemingly lost along the way, 
Somaliland’s foreign minister claiming that only one fifth of aid is actually received.171  
It seems though, that external economic involvement with Somaliland is consistently 
increasing. The US opened a dual-track economic policy to both Mogadishu and Hargeisa 
allowing for an increase in direct aid and cooperation. In June 2011 USAID launched a 
multimillion-dollar initiative, Partnership for Economic Growth in Hargeisa intended on 
spurring business investments and economic growth throughout the region.172 The UK has 
earmarked forty percent of its recently tripled Somalia budget specifically for projects in 
Somaliland, whose stability, democracy and general progress attracts a ‘peace 
dividend.’173 An Anglo-Somaliland Chamber of Commerce has also been established. 
Ethiopia has also entered various trade agreements with Somaliland, establishing a trade 
office in Hargeisa, setting up customs offices along the Somaliland-Ethiopia border and 
signing bilateral agreements over the land-locked state’s access to the Red Sea through 
the port of Berbera. Development of the port is essential if the Red Sea cargo trade is to 
be infiltrated., Ethiopia envisioning that up to twenty percent of its foreign trade would 
eventually flow through the port. Ethiopian airlines have also begun to charter flights to 
Egal International Airport, another important facet of development for the Hargeisa 
government. 
 
South Sudan 
‘Economically, the South faces perhaps one of the most difficult challenges ever 
undertaken’ 174  upon recognition. The combination of budgetary over-stretch and 
economic reliance on oil will remain a challenge for Southern policy-makers. 
Administrative and military salaries accounted for forty percent of the yearly Juba budget 
between 2006 – 2011, while the proposed 2011 budget had only set aside twenty-one 
percent for essential services and development projects. Much of this slim spending 
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concentrates on short-term humanitarian provision rather than establishing public services 
for the long-term,175 making government expenditure reactionary rather than preventative. 
This means a huge amount is spent on salaries and security, while not enough on 
investment in light of state growth and economic expansion. 
Seventy-five percent of Sudan’s oil reserves are in the South. Oil revenue itself accounted 
for ninety-eight percent of the South’s total income between 2009 and 2011. This huge 
figure makes their economy extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations and crashes in 
value.176 The low-level of urbanisation with livestock herders accounting for fifty to sixty 
percent of the population and seasonally migrating, means more conventional forms of 
income like tax on markets and transactions are not present and difficult to establish.177 
Until the CPA, the South had placed virtually no investment in infrastructure, pouring 
their efforts into the war.178 The repercussions of this will be felt for a while, with most of 
the Southern states having to rely on Juba transfers for the bulk of their budget because 
their tax base and administration is inadequate. 
The CPA prescribed that two percent of all oil revenue would remain in areas where crude 
oil is extracted, while the rest is equally divided between North and South. But data on 
South oil production is scarce making division difficult and the guaranteed revenue does 
not always materialise, allegations of corruption remaining rife.179 From 2005 – 2010 
Sudan as a whole was the third-largest recipient of US aid, a large proportion being sent 
to the South and the new government will not face any sanctions or restrictions with US 
business being allowed, unlike North Sudan. The EU had allocated EUR 260 million in 
development aid for the 2011 – 2013 period.180  
 
Findings of Institutions and Economy 
Internal secession theory prescribes that strong levels of institutional and economic state 
features should influence external recognition. The two indicators provide for an 
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observable level of domestic authority, the central indicator for internal theory that if 
well-functioning should tip external states in favour of recognising secession. In the case 
of Somaliland, the hypothesis falls short of explaining its continued status of non-
recognised. No direct link can be established between Somaliland’s levels of institutional 
and economic composition, and external recognition. Somaliland has been able to amass 
impressive levels of governance with very little outside assistance. It has formed 
institutions that should appease democratic states while also accounting for the traditional 
domestic clan authorities. Economically it is not without problems, limited income and 
over-reliance are ongoing issues, but nonetheless it has advanced under a series of 
restraints.  
Empirically, both factors should have causally led to external recognition of Somaliland. 
While this is not the case, the advancement and development of the two indicators has not 
been in vain. Somaliland has been able to attract considerable external assistance due (at 
least in part) to its sustained levels of stability, which internal secession theory would 
likely argue does not completely disprove their argument. This assistance can be depicted 
as demonstrating an interest in developing Somaliland’s domestic authority to an extent 
where recognition can be granted. The link between state make-up and external 
recognition could well be entrenched by the increasing external assistance. The thorn in 
this argument remains of course, the lack of formalised procedure for external recognition. 
However, external secession theory would interject. Such assistance would be portrayed 
as an example of external motive-driven action to advance own interests. External states 
want a stable ally to counter issues laid out in h1. Therefore, providing assistance is a 
means to achieve this. The US is a good example, it hopes that development aid will 
stabilise the region, but is keen to add it continues to ‘ha[ve] nothing to do with the issue 
of recognition.’181  
South Sudan upon independence in July 2011 had been functioning as an independent 
state for almost six years, identifiable central government having been established in Juba 
by the CPA. Upon signing the CPA and cease-fire agreement with the North, the 
secession state could finally begin to address the formidable work ahead of it. The level of 
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institutional capacity and economic options on the eve of independence continued to pose 
serious problems if sustainable domestic authority was to be achieved.  
As denoted, internal secession theory expects strong internal make-up to causally effect 
external recognition. South Sudan does not fall in line with this hypothesis. Empirically, 
the South’s rudimentary level of institutional capacity was only truly established in the 
larger cities. In rural areas there existed no guarantee from governance structures of any 
legal security and often the only physical signs of central control arrived in the form of 
trigger-happy security forces. The overwhelming economic output of oil was a topic of 
consistent contention, especially in light of the South’s extreme dependency on the natural 
resource. 
Neither indicator then would suggest strong levels of domestic authority, especially when 
coupled with the struggles to provide security provision dealt with in h3. Institutional and 
economic make-up struggles to explain the South’s external recognition, rather 
theoretically South Sudan’s internal make-up be associated with non-recognition.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Conclusion 
 
(1) Hybrid Theory Findings  
This thesis has extensively tested two existing models that provide an explanation for 
external recognition of secession amounting to international legal sovereignty. Instead of 
aligning myself only with external or internal secession theory, I opted to use an original 
hybrid theory which allowed for a well-rounded analysis of the forces at play behind 
external recognition. The results indicate this to hold true and so validate, as expected, a 
more complete approach. Both external and internal hypotheses have illustrated links 
relating to external recognition. If only one side of secession theory had provided results, 
the need for a hybrid theory would be less evident. The table shows the results of whether 
the hypothesis when applied, should result in external recognition or not. In all but one 
instance (h4), each hypothesis was able to show an influential link against one of the 
cases. 
 
Hypothesis no. Somaliland South Sudan 
h1. External Security Should  Should  
h2. External home-state Should not  Should  
h3. Internal security Should  Should not  
h4. Internal home-state Should not  Should not 
h5. Internal inst. & economy Should Should not 
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External or Internal? 
Each hypothesis expected to provide an explanation for the dependent variable of external 
recognition. While a hybrid theory offers a more complete picture, the results favour 
external secession theory. That is, external state motives and interests to recognise 
secession, formulated by Coggins. External theory is able to provide influential factors in 
three of four instances while internal theory was only influential in the case of Somaliland. 
This does not mean the theory should be discarded for it remains and has been shown that 
domestic authority can serve to create an environment in which external involvement is 
more likely. 
 
Why Not Somaliland? 
This study set out to isolate factors that explain external recognition leading to 
international legal sovereignty in South Sudan and not in Somaliland. The case of 
Somaliland went against the studies main finding of external explanations and found 
internal factors to be more influential. The only external feature found to be significant 
enough to influence Somaliland recognition was external security (h1). The secessions 
strategic location and level of stability should make the advancement of external security 
gains possible and desirable. Yet this has not resulted in the external recognition of 
Somaliland. I believe the mutually beneficial and interlinked nature of security accounts 
for non-recognition. Internal levels of security can be increased by external involvement 
which serves to increase domestic authority for Somaliland and also external security 
gains for states. This mutually beneficial security exchange against related threats means 
external states have no reason to extend external recognition if their security interests can 
be increased without welcoming a new state to the international community.  
Internal security provision (h3) and institutional and economic make-up (h5) were found 
to show high levels of domestic authority within Somaliland. The findings of both 
hypotheses is expected by internal theory to be influential enough to cause external 
recognition. Coupled, the show of domestic authority is surely enough for external 
recognition.  
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However, two features remain. Both address home-state relations and collectively, 
provide the largest obstacle against external recognition of Somaliland. I find the poor 
home-state relations (h4) between Somaliland and Somalia and the strong level of 
external state – Somalia relations (h2) to reinforce each other and to diminish the 
significance of internal factors amounting to domestic authority (h3 and h5).  
External states do not wish to undermine their efforts to restore stability and counter 
international threats of terrorism and piracy in Somalia. This serves to reinforce Somalia’s 
stern stance of non-secession as little incentive is provided to change their position. As 
shown, although relations are peaceful, politically they are non-existent. Mogadishu 
officials have no reason to open political avenues with Somaliland if they do not need to 
and if this could, in theory (h4), serve to enhance Somaliland’s secession claim. This 
leaves Somaliland in precarious position. It either needs the TFG to become stable enough 
external states to withdrawal, or for the TFG to accept secession and a breakup of Somalia. 
Both remain unlikely for the foreseeable future and supports the notion that the TFG 
holds a veto over Somaliland aspirations.  
Thus, the combination of internal and external home-state relations amount to the most 
important factor in explaining Somaliland’s non-recognition. Herein the advantages of a 
hybrid theory are shown as a two-tier and inclusive explanation can be provided. It serves 
to show that as expected, internal and external factors are interlinked and both should be 
analysed for well-rounded research.  
 
Why South Sudan? 
Results pertaining to South Sudan’s external recognition are different from those of 
Somaliland. External recognition in this instance firmly falls within external explanations. 
It has been proven that external security (h1) and external state – home-state relations (h2) 
were instrumental in South Sudan’s external recognition and provide the most  significant 
factors that explain its external recognition. These explanatory reasons for recognition 
differ from Somaliland’s and serves to bolster the effectiveness of a hybrid theory.  
 - 66 - 
External states had a security based interest in ending the persistent years of conflict and 
turmoil in Sudan. The violence had shown its ability to cause regional destabilisation 
through mass-displacement and spread of conflict. Unlike external involvement in 
Somalia, the ‘bare-minimal’ relations between external states and the Khartoum home-
state represented no real alliance or friendship. External states were only concerned with 
ensuring that al-Bashir signed the CPA and then allowed the peace-agreements provisions 
to be carried out, particularly the January 2011 referendum on independence. This, along 
with al-Bashir’s eventual acceptance of the results, served to eliminate an obstacle to 
South Sudanese external recognition.  
Contrarily, the insufficient level of domestic authority usually associated with non-
recognition and tested through three internal hypotheses, exerted minimal influence and 
acted against expectations. This can be explained, to an extent, by the level and duration 
of violence. The consequences meant very little chance was given to develop any basis of 
domestic authority outside of village authorities and militias. If in reality, this would serve 
as grounds to non-recognition, South Sudan would likely have found itself unrecognised 
for a long time.   
 
‘You cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.’182 Selective Nature of 
External Recognition? 
This appears to be the case. This study has proven that external recognition is largely 
motive and interest driven. There does not exist a standardised rule for recognition. 
Therefore, although Somaliland was more successful across the board than South Sudan, 
it remains unrecognised. Future research should concentrate on this notion of selective 
state-emergence and trace whether external interests have produced sustainable states. 
Here in refer to the possibly of the ‘birth of a failed state’. 
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 (2) Limitations 
The central limitations that are important to note at the end of this study is that the study 
is ongoing. South Sudan is still in its infancy and Somaliland is still in search of external 
recognition. If Somaliland should one day gain external recognition it would be 
interesting to carry out similar research, again with South Sudan, to assess the similarities 
and differences of the states at the time of recognition.     
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ANNEX 
Figures - Somaliland  
  
  
Figure 1 (www.somalilandlaw.com)   Figure 2 (www.quljeednet.com) 
Figure 3 (www.warsintheworld.com) 
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Figures – South Sudan 
Figure 4 (www.canadainternational.gc.ga) 
 
 
Figure 5 (www.landminesinafrica.wordpress.com) 
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